, MSR Redmond
Date: Friday, March 14, 2014
Time: 11:00 AM to 12:00 PM Note: all times are in the Eastern Time Zone
Location: G449 (Patil/Kiva)
Host: Constantinos Daskalakis
Contact: Constantinos Daskalakis, email@example.com
Speaker URL: None
TALK: Draft Auctions
We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show that draft auctions offer an exponential improvement in social welfare at equilibrium over sequential item auctions where predetermined items are auctioned at each time step. Specifically, we show that for any subadditive valuation the social welfare at equilibrium is an O(log^2 m) approximation to the optimal social welfare, where m is the number of items, and a corresponding O(log m) bound for submodular valuations. This is in contrast to an Omega(m) lower bound for sequential item auctions, for a simple subclass of submodular valuations. Our results suggest that draft auctions are a better alternative in instances where sequential item auctions are used, such as government auctions of autos and real estate, wine, art and jewelry auctions at auction houses such as Sothebys and Christies, auctions for players in a professional sports league such as the Indian Premiere League, etc.
Joint work with Jamie Morgenstern and Vasilis Syrgkanis.
Created by Constantinos Daskalakis at Monday, March 10, 2014 at 5:29 PM.