Constantinos Daskalakis: Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport
Date: Tuesday, April 28, 2015
Time: 4:15 PM to 5:15 PM Note: all times are in the Eastern Time Zone
Refreshments: 3:45 PM
Host: Costis Daskalakis, Ankur Moitra, Dana Moshkovitz and Vinod Vaikuntanathan
Contact: Deborah Lehto, 617.324.7303, firstname.lastname@example.org
Speaker URL: None
TALK: Constantinos Daskalakis: Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport
Abstract: I will present an optimization framework based on optimal transport theory, characterizing the structure
of revenue-optimal mechanisms in single-bidder multi-item settings. Our framework provides closed-form descriptions
of mechanisms, generalizes Myerson's celebrated single-item auction, and exhibits simple settings with very rich structure
in their optimal mechanism. Our framework improves previous partial results, by establishing a strong duality theorem
between optimal mechanism design and optimal transportation, and is enabled by an extension of the Monge-Kantorovich
duality that accommodates convexity constraints.
The talk is based on work with Alan Deckelbaum and Christos Tzamos
Created by Deborah Goodwin at Wednesday, February 04, 2015 at 11:01 AM.